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I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska, like most states, has adopted the doctrine of strict
products liability. In attaching strict liability to a defective product,
Alaska follows the stream-of-commerce approach: "'A manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."'" The
Alaska Supreme Court has identified several policy justifications for
the adoption of strict products liability: (1) the costs can best be
borne and distributed throughout society by the manufacturer;
(2) manufacturers will be encouraged to develop safer products; and
(3) manufacturers' fault is often present but difficult to prove.2 A
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manufacturer is not an absolute insurer of his products, however,
and cannot be held liable merely because the product causes
injury.
Strict liability differs from a negligence theory of liability in that
it eliminates the requirement to prove that the manufacturer of the
product was negligent. It focuses not on the conduct of the
manufacturer but on the product itself and holds the manufacturer
liable if the product is deemed defective.
In general, courts have identified three types of product defects.
First, there may be a flaw in the manufacturing process, resulting in
a product that differs from the manufacturer's intended result.4
Second, there are products which are "perfectly" manufactured but
are hazardous because of a defect in the design or the absence of a
safety device.' Third, certain products may be defective because
they lack adequate warnings or instructions.6
The purpose of this article is to provide a practical overview of
Alaska products liability law. In Section II, the article will explore
the historical basis of strict products liability in Alaska, including an
introduction to the court's benchmark decision in Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck (Beck 1).7 Sections III and IV will examine the two
prongs of defect analysis developed in Beck I-consumer expecta-
tions and risk-benefit analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court's
treatment of the failure-to-warn doctrine will be discussed in Section
V, with an added focus on warnings in prescription drug cases.
Section VI will highlight the various defenses which may be
available to manufacturers and retailers of allegedly defective
products. Section VII will analyze the manufacturer's responsibility
to indemnify because of its position at the head of the chain of
commerce.
II. HISTORICAL OvERvIEW
Strict products liability has evolved from two distinct theories:
strict liability and breach of warranty. While strict liability is a tort
concept, the law of product warranties is based on contract. As
these two theories were combined, several policy considerations
3. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1979) (Beck 1).
4. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
5. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 453 (Cal. 1978).
6. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992).
7. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (Beck 1).
[Vol. 10:1
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN ALASKA
became apparent! First, courts believed that justice would be
better served by eliminating the need for injured plaintiffs to prove
fault on the part of manufacturers of defective products. Second,
the courts identified the underlying basis of recovery as the
product's failure to satisfy consumer expectations. Third, imposing
strict liability would provide an incentive for manufacturers to
produce safer goods and thereby reduce the incidence of harm from
unsafe products. Finally, the risks would be allocated to the
manufacturers, forcing them to accept responsibility for defects in
their products.
A. The Development of Strict Products Liability in Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court first adopted strict products liability
in Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler9 by promulgating the rule that:
"'A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being."" In so holding, the court followed the rationale of the
California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc " and stated that: "The purpose of imposing such strict liability
on the manufacturer and retailer is to insure that the cost of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." 2 In adopting
the Greenman approach, the Alaska Supreme Court modified the
plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiff is no longer required to
demonstrate that the defect made the product "unreasonably
dangerous" to the user or that the plaintiff was not aware of the
product's defect.13 Rather, the plaintiff need only prove that the
product was defective and that the defect was a legal cause of his
injuries.14
In following Greenman, the court rejected the standard
proposed by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
8. See generally id. at 877.
9. 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969).
10. Id at 247 (quoting Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897,900
(Cal. 1962)).
11. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
12. Clary, 454 P.2d at 248.
13. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209,214
(Alaska 1975) (Butaud 1).
14. Id
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which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the product's defect
rendered it "unreasonably dangerous."" The court reasoned that
requiring an injured plaintiff to prove not only that the product was
defective, but that it was "unreasonably dangerous" too, would place
an undue burden on the injured party.6 This added burden was
declared to be "a step backwards in the development of products
liability" and antithetical to the policy underlying strict liability.17
The court viewed the purpose of strict liability to be to help the
plaintiff overcome the difficulty of proof inherent in negligence
actions.1" Thus, a plaintiff was deemed to have satisfied his burden
when he proved the existence of a defect, and that such defect
proximately caused his injuries. 9
In Bachner v. Pearson,' the court further refined its concept
of strict liability. The court held that liability attaches to the
manufacturer in a strict products liability case not because the
manufacturer was negligent, but because the product itself was
defective.2 The focus in a such a case, reasoned the court, is not
upon the conduct of the defendant, but rather on the existence of
a defect in the product which causes injuries.' For the manufac-
turer to be liable, the product must have been defective when it left
that manufacturer's possession?23
The court has also held that strict products liability applies to
commercial lease transactions. Since the commercial lessor acts
much like a retailer or manufacturer in placing products in the
stream of commerce, the court perceived no reason to distinguish
between a lease and a sale for purposes of strict products liability.24
No liability results, however, when the lease is simply an isolated
occurrence outside the usual course of the lessor's business. 5
15. Id. at 213 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see
also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 1972).
16. Butaud I, 543 P.2d at 214.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 213; see also Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1158-62.
20. 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
21. Id. at 329.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1983).
24. Bachner, 479 P.2d at 328.
25. Id.; see also Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 250 (Alaska 1977).
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B. The Meaning of "Defective": Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck
In 1979, the Alaska Supreme Court decided the landmark case
of Caterpillar Tractor Co. v Beck (Beck 1). The court adopted
the rule that a product may be defective when either of two
conditions is satisfied:
"(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner [the
"consumer expectations" test], or
(2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately
caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove ... that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk
of danger inherent in such design [the "excessive preventable
danger" test]."'
Beck I involved an alleged design defect in a front-end loader.
The plaintiff was killed when the Caterpillar front-end loader that
he was operating rolled over an embankment. His widow sued
Caterpillar for the wrongful death of her husband, alleging that the
equipment was defectively designed because it was not equipped
with a roll-over protection shield, or "ROPS."'
Caterpillar countered that the loader was not defective because
roll-bar protective devices were not readily available at the time of
design. Caterpillar argued that the loader was intended to be
marketed as a basic structure to the user who, in consultation with
his dealer, would add auxiliary parts as necessary for his particular
use.29
Two facts were undisputed at trial: (1) that a ROPS, as
developed at the time of the accident, would have saved Beck's life
and (2) from a cost and technological standpoint, it was preferable
to have a ROPS installed by the manufacturer at the time of
production. However, there was significant disagreement about the
availability of a ROPS at the time the particular loader was
produced. The court found Caterpillar had made a "deliberate
26. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (Beck 1).
27. Id. at 884 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal.
1978)).
28. Id. at 874-75.
29. Id. at 875.
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decision" not to install any kind of a protective canopy on the
loader model in question as part of its basic design."
After reviewing all of the various tests adopted by courts for
determining whether a design was defective, the Alaska Supreme
Court adopted the approach enunciated by the California Supreme
Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.31 In doing so, the court
reaffirmed its decision in Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler that the
plaintiff satisfies his burden of proof when he proves the existence
of a defect and that such defect was a proximate cause of his
injury." The court, however, emphasized that a product is not
necessarily defective merely because an injury occurred.33 A
manufacturer is not an absolute insurer of its products, and
"'defective' means something more than a condition causing physical
injury."' 4 Likewise, it is not just the absence of any possible safety
device which will render a product legally defective. The final
assessment of "defectiveness" necessarily requires weighing the
diverse factors related to the product's desirability and dangerous-
ness.
36
III. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
The consumer expectations test represents the first prong of the
two part standard for defectiveness announced by the Alaska
Supreme Court in Beck L The first question is whether the product
is being used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.37
A manufacturer must consider not only the item's intended uses, but
reasonably foreseeable ones as well. The second question is
whether, given an intended or reasonably foreseeable use per part
one of the test, the product performed as safely as an ordinary
30. I& at 876. Approximately four years after the specific loader involved in
the case was delivered to the dealer, Caterpillar changed the design of its basic
vehicle model and was installing the ROPS as standard equipment on each of its
loaders. Id.
31. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
32. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 878.
33. Id. at 879.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. I& at 883.
37. Id at 884-85.
38. Id. at 885.
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consumer would expect.39  In answering this inquiry, the jury
considers the expectations of a hypothetical reasonable consumer,
rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case."
A. Foreseeability
"Foreseeable use" in products liability cases focuses on what is
foreseeable to the manufacturer, rather than on the subjective
knowledge held by the consumer.4' "Foreseeable use" refers to the
way the product was actually used, regardless of the consumer's
knowledge of the defect at the time of the accident.42
In determining the foreseeability of certain uses, the court has
on several occasions looked to the manufacturer's advertising for
guidance. For example, in Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,43 the
court held an advertisement prepared by Kawasaki would have
probative value in demonstrating foreseeability of a particular
use.' In Hiller, the plaintiff was injured when he attempted to
jump his Kawasaki snow machine over a three-foot embankment at
a speed of approximately thirty-five miles per hour. He sued
Kawasaki alleging that the snow machine's defective design and
manufacture were ultimately responsible for his injuries. At trial,
the plaintiff attempted to introduce into evidence a videotape of a
published advertisement in which a person was shown riding a
Kawasaki snow machine through the air in the process of jumping
an embankment. The trial court excluded the videotape. 5 The
supreme court reversed, agreeing with the plaintiff that the
advertisement was relevant to establishing the foreseeable use of the
snow machine; the advertisement clearly demonstrated Kawasaki's
ability to foresee the particular use.4
39. Id.
40. See Lamer v. McKee Indus., 721 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska 1986).
41. Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 373 n.2 (Alaska 1983).
42. Lamer, 721 P.2d at 615. If the consumer is not only aware of the defect,
but also knows of the danger accompanying it, his recovery may be reduced under
the doctrine of comparative negligence. Id. For a discussion of comparative
negligence, see infra text accompanying notes 146-156.
43. 671 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986).
44. Id. at 373.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The court in Dura Corp. v. Hamed47 again looked to the
manufacturer's advertising as an indicator of foreseeability. The
plaintiff was injured when a portable air tank exploded while he was
filling it with air.' At trial the manufacturer and the injured
plaintiff each argued different theories of causation. The plaintiff
argued that the tank was too thin when it was manufactured and
that corrosion made it even thinner, thus causing the tank's failure.
The manufacturer argued that the tank failed due to overuse.
According to the manufacturer, the tank was intended only for
infrequent emergency utilization.49
The supreme court rejected the manufacturer's argument of
unforeseeable excessive use.50 In so doing, the court relied upon
the manufacturer's advertising that the tank had "thousands of
uses," that it was suitable for a variety of different applications, and
that it was "absolutely durable."'" The court found it to be
reasonably foreseeable that the consumer would use the air tank as
he had 2
The "foreseeable use" required under the first prong of Beck
considers only the way that the product is physically used, regardless
of whether the consumer was aware of the defect at the time of the
accident.53 Such foreseeable use may extend to uses or methods
of use which are outside the manufacturer's recommendations. In
Lamer v. McKee Industries,54 the plaintiff's son was killed after
falling while attempting to repair a garage door. The plaintiff sued
McKee Industries, claiming strict liability for the defective manufac-
ture or design of a spring winding plug, part of the mechanism that
raises and lowers garage doors.5 The decedent had been in the
business of repairing overhead doors and had substantial experience
in working with garage doors' spring winding plugs. When he fell,
the decedent was not utilizing the manufacturer's recommended
47. 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985).
48. Id. at 399.
49. 1& at 400.
50. Id. at 407.
51. 1&
52. Id.
53. Lamer v. McKee Indus., 721 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska 1986).
54. 721 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986).
55. 1& at 612.
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repair approach, but rather followed a method that was much more
physically demanding for the repair person, but could save substan-
tial time if successful.
56
The jury found in favor of the defendant manufacturer,
indicating that the winding plug was not defective5 7 On appeal,
the supreme court disagreed, rejecting the defendant's argument
that it could not be held liable under the consumer expectations
prong of Beck because the winding plug was not being used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." According to the
supreme court, however, merely because the winding plug was not
being used in an intended manner did not make it unforeseeable. 9
Several witnesses testified that the decedent's use of the winding
plug was common in the industry. The court emphasized that the
manufacturer must consider not only intended uses of the product,
but reasonably foreseeable uses as well. The court reasoned that
"[i]t is a matter of common sense that a manufacturer should not be
relieved of responsibility simply because it closes its eyes to the way
its products are actually used by consumers."'  Thus, in the
context of determining whether a product is defective, "foreseeable
use" means the way the product was physically used, regardless of
the consumer's actual subjective knowledge of the defect6' at the
time of the accident, and irrespective of whether that use was
intended by the manufacturer; so long as the particular use is
reasonably foreseeable, the manufacturer may be held strictly liable
when the product causes injury.62
In Ross Laboratories v. Thies,6 the court expanded the
concept of foreseeability of misuse in holding the manufacturer to
a rigid standard. Ross Laboratories involved injuries to an infant.
Ross Laboratories manufactured Polycose, a dietary supplement for
adults that can be dangerous to infants if it is not sufficiently diluted
56. Id. at 614.
57. Id. at 613.
58. Id. at 615.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. The user's subjective knowledge may be relevant to the issue of compara-
tive negligence, but not to the issue of defect. Id. For a discussion of comparative
negligence, see infra text accompanying notes 146-156.
62. See Lamer, 721 P.2d. at 615.
63. 725 P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986).
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before consumption. The infant in Ross Laboratories became
severely dehydrated when she was fed Polycose by her mother. The
manufacturer argued it should not be liable because Polycose was
not intended to be a product for infants. However, the retailer
selling the product had mistakenly placed Polycose on its baby
products shelf.'
The supreme court ruled that Ross Laboratories should have
foreseen that Polycose would mistakenly be fed to infants.' The
label contained no warning that the product was dangerous if not
sufficiently diluted, and the product was sold in nipple-ready bottles.
Ross Laboratories marketed other products for consumption by
infants in similar bottles.' According to the court, "[t]he nipple-
ready bottle, taken together with the similarity in name, label, and
contents with recognized baby products, required Ross Laboratories
to foresee that some consumers would mistakenly believe that
Polycose was a product to be fed to infants."'67 Accordingly, the
manufacturer's duty to foresee extends beyond only careful uses,'
as the court reasoned that "[m]istake, inadvertence, and negligence
are everyday occurrences., 69
B. Failure to Satisfy Consumer Expectations
In assessing whether a product meets a consumer's expectations,
the second part of the Beck test, the Alaska Supreme Court has
noted several ways in which those expectations may be frustrated:
(1) The product fails to perform its intended function (e.g.,
brakes that fail);
(2) The product creates a danger against which it was supposed
to guard (e.g., polio vaccine that causes polio);
(3) The product performs its intended function but creates a
bad side effect (e.g., cigarettes that cause cancer);(4) The product fails to minimize avoidable consequences in
the event of an accident (e.g., automobile without head
rest).70
64. 1& at 1078.
65. Id. at 1078-799.
66. Id. at 1078.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1079.
69. Id.
70. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 n.33 (Alaska 1979) (Beck
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In many cases, however, it is difficult to determine whether a
manufacturing or design defect is involved. The Alaska Supreme
Court has recognized that the distinction between manufacturing
and design defects is not clear and that overlap between the two
categories is unavoidable.7' In fact, the court has stated that rigid
delineation is neither necessary nor desirable7 Furthermore, the
categories not only overlap, but may also operate simultaneously or
be alleged in the alternative.7 3 Accordingly, while the court
recognizes that it may be useful to describe products liability claims
in terms of design and manufacturing defects, it also believes that a
plaintiff who successfully establishes that a product is defective
should not be subject to the additional burden of proving whether
or not the precise cause of a defect was the product's design or
manufacture.74 The court seeks to avoid creating the battleground
for clever lawyers as foreseen by the California Supreme Court,
which stated that: "'It is difficult to prove that a product ultimately
caused injury because a widget was poorly welded-a defect in
manufacture-rather than because it was made of inexpensive metal
difficult to weld ... -a defect in design."'75  Thus, an injured
plaintiff proceeding under the consumer expectations prong of Beck
need not prove whether the defect was caused by the product's
manufacture or design.
An important question under Beck's consumer expectations
prong is who is considered the "ordinary consumer" of the product.
The Alaska Supreme Court has noted the problematic nature of this
issue on several occasions.76 In Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc..' the
court held that the expectations of the ordinary consumer must be
determined by an objective test. The court stated, "[i]f the
defendant knew that one individual consumer could not safely use
1) (citing Reed Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability, 36 TENN. L. REv. 439,
454 (1969)).
71. Colt Indus. v. Frank W. Murphy Mfr., 822 P.2d 925, 930 (Alaska 1991).
72. Id.
73. Id. See also Beck I, 593 P.2d at 878 n.15.
74. Colt Indus., 822 P.2d at 930 n.5 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501
P.2d 1153, 1162-63 (Cal. 1972)).
75. Id. (quoting Cronin, 501 P.2d at 1163).
76. See, e.g., Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1351 n.17 (Alaska
1991).
77. 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991).
1993]
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its product, that defendant may be negligent. That defendant will
not be strictly liable under the first prong of Beck, however, unless
the product fails to meet the safety expectations of the ordinary
consumer."
78
Keogh involved strict liability claims made by a municipal
employee who was shocked and severely injured while working on
an electrical system that the defendant corporation had upgraded.
The trial court had refused to instruct the jury "that the employees
of [the municipality] were the exclusive users.., or consumers of
the upgrade system," and had ruled instead that determination of
the "ordinary consumer" was within the jury's province.79
On appeal, the supreme court held that the ordinary consumer
standard is necessarily an objective one.' Accordingly, the trial
court was correct to refuse the limitation proposed by the plain-
tiff.8 In the context of the electrical distribution system at issue in
the case, the court held it was correct to permit each party to argue
its theory of "the ordinary consumer" to the jury.'
By contrast, in Lamer v. McKee Industries,' a case also
decided under the consumer expectations prong of Beck, the court
accepted the parties' characterization that the ordinary consumer of
garage door winding plugs should be the "professional garage door
repairperson."' This determination was largely based on a safety
warning label attached by the manufacturer to the garage door. The
label cautioned that repairs and adjustments should be performed
only by qualified door service people." The Lamer court stated
that the "inquiry must focus on the evidence concerning the
expectations of experts in the overhead garage door business."86
In discussing the evidence, the court concluded that winding plug
failure was a surprise to "professionals in the overhead garage door
78. Id. at 1352.
79. Id at 1351. The court assumed, but did not decide, that the electrical
system was a product for purposes of product liability law. Id. at 1345.
80. Id at 1351-52.
81. Id. at 1352.
82. Id at 1351 n.17.
83. 721 P.2d 611 (Alaska 1986). For discussion of the facts of the case, see
supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
84. Id. at 616.
85. Id.
86. Id (emphasis added).
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business," and that "an experienced garage door repairperson
expects a winding plug to be able to withstand any force applied
through a hand-held winding bar."'
Finally, in some instances, the expectations of the "ordinary
consumer" may be nearly impossible to determine or irrelevant to
the imposition of strict liability. In Shanks v. Upjohn Co.," the
Alaska Supreme Court recognized this to be the case when dealing
with prescription drugs.8 9
The court supported its declaration with several observations.
A prescription drug's performance safety depends on many factors,
including the nature of the drug, the patient's medical history,
dosage, and its combination with other medications. This complex
interplay is beyond the understanding of the ordinary consumer. In
addition, since a drug manufacturer's duty to warn is satisfied if it
provides adequate warnings to the prescribing physician, it is
doubtful that the average consumer has the information necessary
to form a reasonable expectation concerning the performance safety
of most prescription products.' Consequently, if the consumer
expectations test were applied rigidly to prescription drugs, a drug
manufacturer might be held strictly liable when the drug performed
in a way that was unexpected by the "ordinary consumer," even
though the drug performed in a manner which was well within the
expectations of the prescribing physician and the manufacturer.
Accordingly, in Shanks the court concluded that the ordinary
consumer's expectations regarding prescription drugs are in most
cases irrelevant to whether strict liability should be imposed.9'
Because of the problems inherent in imposing the ordinary
consumer expectations test upon prescription drugs, the supreme
court in Shanks developed a new test. The relevant inquiry is now
the doctor's expectation, not that of the patient, regarding the
performance and safety of a prescription drug. Consequently, the
following test is applied in the case of prescription drugs: "[A]
prescription drug is defectively designed and strict liability should be
imposed on its manufacturer if the prescription drug failed to
87. Id.
88. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
89. Id. at 1194-95.
90. Id
91. Id at 1195.
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perform as safely as an ordinary doctor would expect, when used by
the patient in an intended and reasonably foreseeable manner."'
The court did, however, recognize that there are certain types of
prescription drugs (such as contraceptives), for which the physician's
involvement is minimal and the courts have traditionally held that
manufacturers have a duty to warn patients directly. In such cases,
it is appropriate to apply the "ordinary consumer" expectations test
rather than the "ordinary doctor" expectations test.93
IV. RISK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
There are certain cases in which liability would not be imposed
under the consumer expectations test despite the fact that the
purposes of the rule would be best served by holding the manufac-
turer liable. If the consumer expectations test were the only basis
for imposing strict liability, plaintiffs would be more likely to
recover when the danger was hidden than when it was patent or
obvious. 4 There are also many products about which the consum-
er has limited safety expectations, because he would be unaware if
the item could be produced in a fashion that would yield a safer
good. In addition, the consumer expectations test would operate as
a shield against strict liability where the product does not fall below
the ordinary consumer's expectations as to the product's safety. 5
The supreme court was particularly concerned that two purposes of
strict liability, risk allocation and risk avoidance, would be ill-served
if manufac-turers were to escape liability when the dangerous
characteristics of the product are open and obvious. 6
The court adopted the second prong of the Beck defectiveness
test for those situations, such as the lack of a safety device, where
the product satisfies ordinary consumer expectations as to its general
92. 1&
93. Id. at 1195 n.7.
94. The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected the distinction between patent and
latent defects because it is viewed as unnecessarily restrictive to plaintiffs. See
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882 (Alaska 1979) (Beck 1); Butaud
v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209, 214 (Alaska 1975)
(Butaud 1).
95. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 882.
96. Id. at 882 n.34.
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use, but is still defective because its design exposes the user or
bystander to excessive preventable danger.
Under the second Beck test, the plaintiff must establish a primafacie case by introducing sufficient evidence to permit a jury to
find that the product's design features were a proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury. Once the plaintiff has made this showing,
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. After the burden
of proof shifts, the defendant may choose to offer evidence
relevant to a risk-benefit evaluation of its product's design or it
may attempt to refute the plaintiff's theory of causation. '
Since it is the manufacturer who seeks to avoid liability for an injury
proximately caused by the product's design on a risk-benefit theory,
it is the manufacturer who bears the burden of persuading the jury
that its product should not be judged defective.98
According to the supreme court, the primary policy justification
for shifting the burden of proof to the manufacturer is that it places
the responsibility of producing the relevant complex and technical
evidence on the party who is most familiar with and has the better
access to it.99
In those cases where the excessive preventable danger prong of
Beck is the appropriate test, the plaintiff's burden is simply to show
that the product's design proximately caused the injuries. The
product's design will be deemed the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury if the defective product was more likely than not a
substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injury."3 The
"substantial factor" test has been defined as follows: "'[I]f two
forces are operating to cause the injury, one because of the
defendant's [product] and the other not, and each force by itself is
sufficient to cause the injury, then the defendant's [product] may be
found to be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."'
The issue of proximate cause is normally a question of fact for
the jury to determine and becomes a matter of law only where
97. Dura Corp. v. Hamed, 703 P.2d 396, 406 (Alaska 1985) (citation omitted).
98. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 885 (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455
(Cal. 1978)).
99. Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343,1347 n.5 (Alaska 1991); see also
Beck 1, 593 P.2d at 886.
100. Keogh, 816 P.2d at 1347 (quoting Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 406).
101. Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 406 (quoting State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 727
(Alaska 1972)) (first alteration in original).
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reasonable minds cannot differ." z  Once the plaintiff meets his
burden of establishing proximate cause, the manufacturer (or
retailer) may attempt to refute the plaintiff's theory of causation or
offer evidence relevant to a risk-benefit evaluation of its product's
design.'03
In the risk-benefit analysis the jury balances the risk of harm
and the social utility of the product. The balancing necessarily
requires the weighing of various factors. Among them are the
following considerations: (1) the gravity of danger posed by the
design, (2) the likelihood that such danger would occur, (3) the
mechanical feasibility of an alternative design, (4) the financial cost
of an alternative design and (5) adverse consequences to the product
and consumer resulting from an alternative design."°  The jury
may also consider technological infeasibility, but mere conformity
with industry practices will not protect a manufacturer. 0 5
In Ross Laboratories v. Thies,"° the court applied the risk-
benefit portion of the Beck test, holding as a matter of law that the
risks of product misuse outweighed the benefits of the product's
labeling and design. As discussed above,"°7 after holding that a
retailer's mistake of stocking the adult dietary supplement on the
infant products shelf should have been foreseeable to the manufac-
turer as a matter of law, the court addressed the risk-benefit analysis
that would be required under the second prong of Beck:
In our view, no such cost benefit analysis is required. The cost
of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal, i.e., the
expense of adding more printing to a label, that the balance
must always be struck in favor of the obligation to warn where
there is a substantial danger which will not be recognized by the
ordinary userJ' s
The court took a further step in Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,"°
when it refused to exempt a manufacturer of prescription drugs
102. Id
103. Id.
104. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979) (Beck
1).
105. Id at 887.
106. 725 P.21 1076 (Alaska 1986).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69.
108. Ross Labs., 725 P.2d at 1079.
109. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
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from the application of risk-benefit analysis. In Shanks, the trial
court held that it would contravene public policy to apply the risk-
benefit test of Beck to prescription drugs."' However, the su-
preme court rejected this approach in holding that the manufacturer
of prescription drugs will bear the same burden of demonstrating
that the benefits of its particular drug outweigh the inherent
risks."' In so ruling, the court refused to recognize a class of
products which are inherently unsafe or unavoidably dangerous.
The trial court had followed the rationale of the California Supreme
Court in Brown v. Superior Court."' The Brown court recognized
that, despite the potential for serious risks, because drugs can save
lives and reduce pain, there is a social utility and public interest that
supports encouraging pharmaceutical companies to introduce and
develop new products."1 In reversing, the Alaska Supreme Court
held that public policy concerns underlying the doctrine of strict
liability must be balanced against, rather than yield to, the public
interest in the availability and affordability of safe prescription
drugs.14
Thus, in the special case of prescription drugs, the jury should
consider the following factors in determining whether the risks of
the particular drug outweigh its benefits: (1) the severity of the side
effects or reactions posed by the drug, (2) the likelihood that such
side effects or reactions will occur, (3) the feasibility of an alterna-
tive design that would eliminate or reduce the side effects or
reactions without effecting the performance of the drug and (4) the
harm to the consumer in terms of any reduced efficacy and new side
effects or reactions that would result from an alternative design."5
In Shanks, the court framed the test as follows:
In evaluating the benefits, the fact finder should be permitted to
consider the seriousness of the condition for which the drug is
indicated. ... What the trier of fact should determine in
balancing these factors is whether the drug confers an important
benefit and whether the interest in its availability outweighs the
110. Id. at 1194.
111. Id. at 1196.
112. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
113. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1194 (citing Brown, 751 P.2d. at 478-80).
114. Id at 1196.
115. IM. at 1196-97.
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interest in promoting the enhanced accountability which strict
products liability design defect review provides."6
In its Shanks decision, the court declined to follow the majority
of states that have considered the issue and adopted comment k to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts."7 Com-
ment k defines certain products as unavoidably unsafe, especially in
the field of drugs. Such products, when properly prepared and
accompanied by proper directions and warnings, are not considered
defective and are not unreasonably dangerous. Comment k
recognizes that the seller of such products should not be held strictly
liable "for unfortunate consequences attending [the product's] use,
merely because [it] has undertaken to supply the public with an
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk."'1 8 While the Alaska Supreme Court
looked at the "soundness of the policy underlying comment k," it
refused to adopt it for three reasons: (1) comment k has contribut-
ed to the confusion which permeates products liability law and blurs
the distinction between negligence and strict liability principles, (2)
other courts are unable to agree on the comment's scope and (3) the
Beck test's risk-benefit analysis offers the manufacturers of those
products intended to be protected by comment k an opportunity to
avoid responsibility for strict liability claims based on a design defect
theory.'1
9
In deciding Shanks, the court held that decisions about the
social utility of certain products will be left to the jury. Rather than
allowing experts to decide the issue, juries will now be required to
sort through the myriad social and scientific issues related to the
risks and benefits of a particular drug. This position effectively
creates a disincentive for manufacturers to produce and distribute,
in Alaska, drugs with benefits that balance or possibly outweigh any
potential serious dangers.
In Shanks, the court also specifically rejected the manufacturer's
suggestion that courts should defer to determinations of the Food
and Drug Administration as to the safety and efficacy of a particular
drug. "[S]uch deference," reasoned the court, "in the face of
116. hi at 1197.
117. Id.
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
119. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1197-98.
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allegations of serious injuries caused by FDA-approved drugs would
amount to an abdication of judicial responsibility."'"
V. FAILURE TO WARN
Even if there is no ascertainable flaw in a product's manufac-
ture or design, and the item is precisely what it is intended to be,
Alaska law may treat a product as defective if a manufacturer fails
to give adequate and timely warnings about the hazards that may
result from use.12' A manufacturer's failure to warn necessarily
involves some overlap between concepts of negligence and strict
products liability. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized this
redundancy but has held that in strict liability cases, the need for
and the sufficiency of a warning should be evaluated without
reference to negligence principles." Although an injured plaintiff
may frequently plead both negligent and strict liability failure-to-
warn claims, the jury must be instructed separately on each count.
In Patricia R. v. Sullivan," the court quoted with approval the
Washington Supreme Court:
"[The objective of the rule of strict liability with respect to
dangerous products is defeated if a plaintiff is required to prove
that the defendant was negligent, or the latter is allowed to
defend upon the ground that he was free of negligence. It is the
adequacy of the warning which is given or the necessity of such
a warning, which must command the jury's attention, not the
defendant's conduct.1
124
Accordingly, as in all strict products liability claims, the focus must
be on the product, and here the warning accompanying it, and not
upon the manufacturer's conduct.
In Prince v. Parachutes, Inc.,"z the court adopted the follow-
ing statement of the duty-to-warn concept in the context of strict
products liability: "A product is defective if the use of the product
in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable by the defendant involves
a substantial danger that would not be readily recognized by the
120. Id. at 1197 n.10.
121. See Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984).
122. Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91, 102 (Alaska 1981).
123. 631 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1981).
124. Id. (quoting Little v. PPG Indus., 594 P.2d 911,914 (Wash. 1979) (alteration
in original)).
125. 685 P.2d 83 (Alaska 1984).
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ordinary user of the product and the manufacturer fails to give
adequate warning of such danger."'1 It is the knowledge of the
ordinary user of the product that is relevant to the duty to warn,
rather than the knowledge of the actual user."z The injured
party's actual subjective knowledge is irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether the manufacturer owed a duty to warn to the
ordinary user of the product."
In Prince, the alleged defect was a parachute manufacturer's
failure to warn users that one of its models should be used only by
the most experienced jumpers.Y19 The fact that the injured plain-
tiff had used the parachute model at issue on previous occasions and
experienced difficulty was ruled irrelevant to the plaintiff's strict
liability failure-to-warn claim."
The plaintiff had learned to parachute using a standard military
round-canopy parachute. After making twenty-nine jumps using the
military round canopy, the plaintiff was offered the use of the
triangular canopy model manufactured by the defendant. He was
aware that there were variations in parachutes and was instructed to
obtain the permission of a U.S. Parachute Association area safety
officer before using this more advanced equipment.'
Prior to the accident, the plaintiff jumped five times using the
defendant's parachute and experienced difficulty landing on each
occasion. During his sixth jump, as he was maneuvering to land, the
plaintiff collided with another parachutist, and, as a result, fell thirty
feet to the ground.'
The trial judge granted summary judgment for the manufactur-
er, holding there was no duty to warn of the flight characteristics of
the parachute in question, since the plaintiff had actual knowledge
of the parachute's dangerous characteristics. The trial judge also
concluded that the manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment
126. Id. at 88; See also Patricia R., 631 P.2d at 102 (product is required to have
warnings only as to hazards or dangers that would not be readily recognized by
ordinary user of product).
127. Prince, 685 P.2d at 88.
128. Id
129. Id. at 86.
130. Id. at 88 (plaintiff's prior use of the parachute was, however, relevant to the
manufacturer's defense of comparative negligence).
131. IM. at 85.
132. Id.
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on the issue of causation.33 The supreme court reversed, agreeing
with the plaintiff that there should be objective criteria to determine
the existence of a duty to warn.M
Once again, the court emphasized that the focus in a strict
liability case must be on the condition of the product itself. The
knowledge and acts of the plaintiff are irrelevant to a determination
of whether the parachute was defective in not containing adequate
warnings. 35 Accordingly, whether an ordinary parachutist would
readily recognize that the triangular canopy parachute should be
used only by an experienced individual is a question of fact. The
plaintiff's subjective awareness was relevant only to the manufactur-
er's defense of comparative negligence.'
In Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 37 the supreme court again
found a jury question as to whether the "manufacturer," here of the
upgrade to an electrical distribution system, had an obligation to
warn of the dangers present. 3 ' As discussed above,'39 in addi-
tion to design defect claims, the plaintiff argued that defendant had
failed to warn him of the dangers of electricity inherent in the
upgraded system. The trial court refused to direct a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff on his strict liability claim, which was based on the
manufacturer's failure to warn. The jury found in favor of the
manufacturer.' The supreme court ruled that it was proper to
submit a failure-to-warn claim to the jury.'4' The court reasoned
that the facts of the case sufficiently created "a jury issue on the
adequacy of the warnings, especially given the well-known dangers
of high voltage electricity."'42
Finally, in Shanks v. Upjohn Co., the court identified for
the first time the factors necessary for a warning to be considered
133. ML at 87.
134. IL at 87-88.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 89. For a discussion of comparative negligence see infra text
accompanying notes 146-156.
137. 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991).
138. Id. at 1348.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
140. Keogh, 816 P.2d at 1345.
141. Id. at 1348.
142. Id. at 1348 n.9.
143. 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992).
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adequate. The warning should "(1) clearly indicate the scope of the
risk or danger posed by the product, (2) reasonably communicate
the extent or seriousness of the harm that could result from the risk
or danger, and (3) be conveyed in such a manner as to alert the
reasonably prudent person."" In enumerating these factors, the
court reemphasized that a strict liability failure-to-warn claim should
not be presented to the jury in negligence terms. The court
elaborated that:
Under a strict liability failure to warn theory, if the plaintiff
proves that the product as marketed posed a risk of injury to
one who uses the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner
and the product is marketed without adequate warnings of the
risk, the product is defective. If such a defect is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the manufacturer is strictly liable
unless the defendant manufacturer can prove that the risk was
scientifically unknowable at the time the product was distributed
to the plaintiff.14
VI. DEFENSES TO STRicr LiABirrY CLAIMS
Several defenses to strict liability have been litigated since the
Alaska Supreme Court's Beck I decision. Principal among these is
the extent to which a plaintiff's comparative negligence may affect
the strict liability of the manufacturer. Other defenses that have
been raised with some success include scientific unavailability,
superseding or intervening cause, subsequent modification of the
product, and mere repairs (versus manufacture) of an item. In
addition, the court has distinguished between property damage and
economic loss in permitting recovery of damages in a strict liability
action.
A. Comparative Negligence
The defense of comparative negligence may apply in personal
injury cases based on strict liability in tort.146 A plaintiff's compar-
ative negligence will not defeat a claim for personal injuries in a
strict products liability case. Rather, a plaintiff's comparative
negligence will only serve to reduce any award of damages in his
144. Mf at 1200.
145. Mf at 1199-1200 (citation omitted).
146. Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83, 88 (Alaska 1984).
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favor.147 Before the jury can consider whether the plaintiff was
comparatively negligent, it must first find the product was defective
and that such defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.'48
The defense is not limited to those cases where the plaintiff
uses the product with knowledge of the defective condition. It also
extends to those cases in which the plaintiff misuses the product and
such misuse is a proximate cause of his or her injuries. 149  The
Alaska Supreme Court has emphasized that the manufacturer is still
accountable for all harm caused by a defective product, except for
the portion caused by the consumer's own negligence. 50 Howev-
er, mere use of the product with knowledge of the lack of a safety
device will not qualify as misuse, as the court has stated that:
We do not believe that a consumer who uses a product as it was
intended to be used, and who knows or should know of the lack
of a safety device, can be deemed to have misused the product
within the meaning of Butaud I. If a jury finds that a product
is defective by virtue of its lack of a safety feature, plaintiffs
failure to install such a device will not reduce his recovery based
upon his mere knowledge of the inadequate safety features of
the product.151
Accordingly, in those cases where the design defect is the lack of a
safety device, the defense of comparative negligence is essentially
one of assumption of the risk. The court should instruct the jury on
comparative negligence only if the plaintiff (1) knowingly uses a
defective product and (2) voluntarily and unreasonably encounters
the known risk.5 2 An injured party's failure to exercise simple
ordinary care is not sufficient to raise a jury question on the issue
of comparative negligence in a strict products liability case.53
147. Id at 89 n.3 (Alaska 1984).
148. 1&
149. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46
(Alaska 1976) (Butaud I1), modifying Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting
Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975) (Butaud 1).
150. Id- at 46
151. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 890-91 (Alaska 1979) (Beck
1).
152. Id. at 892.
153. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 405 n.5 (Alaska 1985).
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The manufacturer bears the burden of proving the plaintiff's
actual knowledge of the defect if it is part of its affirmative
defense.'-4 However, a sophisticated scientific understanding of
the mechanism of the defect is not a prerequisite to the defense of
comparative negligence. 5 -5  The knowledge component of the
affirmative defense may be satisfied by awareness of the effect of the
defect, as opposed to knowledge of the precise technical source or
cause of that effect. 56
B. Scientific Unknowability
Where the risk of the particular danger involved is scientifically
unknowable when the product is marketed, the manufacturer
generally will not be held liable in strict products liability. 7
Therefore, in certain circumstances, a scientific knowability
instruction to the jury is proper.
For example, in Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales,5 8 the
supreme court approved of a scientific knowability instruction based
on evidence suggesting that exposure to certain concentrations of
formaldehyde was "not known scientifically to cause permanent
deep lung damage of the type suffered" by one of the plaintiffs.5 9
Conversely, on appeal after remand in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck (Beck 11),"6 the court rejected the use of a scientific know-
ability instruction because the manufacturer had made a "deliberate
decision" not to install the particular safety device at issue.'61
According to the court, such a decision could not have been made
without some recognition of the dangers involved. The court also
reasoned that the particular risk that a person could be injured in a
154. Id. at 404.
155. Brinkerhoff v. Swearingen Aviation Corp., 663 P.2d 937,941 (Alaska 1983).
156. Id.
157. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 792 n.3 (Alaska 1981) (Beck
I).
158. 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979).
159. Id. at 1063.
160. 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981) (Beck I).
161. Id at 792-93. For discussion of the facts of the case, see infra text
accompanying notes 26-36.
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front-end loader that overturns was too apparent to raise a scientific
knowability issue."
The jury may balance the scientifically knowable danger
inherent in the product at the time it was sold and the utility of the
product."' The defense is limited to those cases where "the
knowability" of the dangerous character of the product is at
issue,"6 and when it applies, the burden of establishing scientific
unknowability falls upon the manufacturer."s
C. Superseding Cause
The defense of superseding cause applies in strict products
liability cases, but it is available only in extraordinary circumstances.
A superseding cause occurs where "'[a]fter the event and looking
back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to
the court highly extraordinary that [the conduct] should have
brought about the harm.""'  A finding of superseding cause
means the manufacturer's duty to prevent harm to someone because
of its defective product shifts to a third party, but only in "excep-
tional cases."167
In Dura Corp. v. Harned,'" the trial court denied the defend-
ant's request for a superseding cause instruction. As noted
earlier, 69 on appeal, the manufacturer argued that overuse of an
air tank led to its fatigue and subsequent explosion. The
supreme court rejected the suggestion that the overuse constituted
a superseding cause because it was not "highly extraordinary" that
a consumer would frequently use the equipment.
162. Id
163. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1064.
164. Id.
165. Beck II, 624 P.2d at 793 n.4.
166. Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 402 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Yukon
Equip., Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428,433 n.4 (Alaska 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965), rev'd on other grounds).
167. Id. at 402-03 (citing Osborne v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 558 (Alaska 1983)).
168. 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
170. Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 400.
171. Id. at 403.
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In Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc.,' the court expanded upon its
Dura Corp. holding. In Keogh, the court reasoned that not every
intervening cause will supersede the defendant's conduct to the
extent that such cause will be deemed the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.' If an intervening cause "'lies within the scope
of the foreseeable risk, or has a reasonable connection to it, [it] is
not a superseding cause.""' 74 The court further reasoned that the
jury should be permitted to decide the question of a superseding
cause only if it concludes that the product is defective and that such
defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
D. Subsequent Modification of the Product
In several cases, the Alaska Supreme Court has emphasized
that for strict products liability to attach the product must be
defective at the time it leaves the manufacturer's possession or
control.'76 A design defect, for example, must be measured by the
knowledge and information that existed when the product left the
hands of the manufacturer.'" It may also be a defense for the
manufacturer that the item had been substantially altered after it
left the plant, as "a substantial change in the product after it leaves
the manufacturer's hands will ordinarily defeat a claim based on
strict tort liability."'7 The rule has been stated as follows: "[T]o
the extent that an injury, caused by a substantially altered product
is the result of the product's alteration and not a result of a product
'defect' existing at the time of manufacture, the manufacturer is not
liable for the injuries."'79
The manufacturer bears the burden of proving that the product
was substantially altered after leaving its possession."8 But before
172. 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991). For discussion of the facts of the case, see
supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
173. Keogh, 816 P.2d at 1350.
174. 1& (quoting Dura Corp., 703 P.2d at 402).
175. 1& at 1350 n.13.
176. See e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 886 n.52 (Alaska
1979) (Beck 1); Hiller v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 671 P.2d 369, 372 (Alaska 1983).
177. Beck I, 593 P.2d at 886 n.52.
178. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790,793 (Alaska 1981) (Beck If).
179. Hiller, 671 P.2d at 372.
180. Id.
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the manufacturer is put to the "trouble and expense" of establishing
alteration of its product, the plaintiff must first establish that the
product was defective at the time that it left the manufacturer's
possession.181 The manufacturer may then introduce evidence of
substantial subsequent alteration to "rebut or overcome" the
plaintiff's showing that his injuries resulted from the manufacturer's
defect.'"
E. Used Products and Repairs
Strict liability generally applies to products and not to services
such as repair work.'" The seller of used products may be held
strictly liable, however, if the products have undergone extensive
repair, inspection, and testing at the seller's hands prior to re-
sale.'" It is not enough that the sellers repaired or even "rebuilt"
the product. The seller would "have to do something more than sell
an attachment for [a] vehicle, agree to put it on, and agree to repair
the part of the vehicle that eventually breaks" in order to be held
strictly liable for selling a defective product.'"
F. Property Damage versus Economic Loss
The Alaska Supreme Court has limited the scope of recovery
in strict products liability claims by refusing to find liability for mere
"economic loss," or lost profits.'" The court has elected to
"4preserve '... . the well developed notion that the law of contract
should control actions for purely economic losses and that the law
of tort should control actions for personal injuries.""'  The court
has reasoned that application of strict products liability to pure
economic losses would interfere with the contractual remedies
181. IL
182. Id
183. Swenson Trucking & Excavating v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113,
1116-17 (Alaska 1980).
184. Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150,154 n.6 (Alaska
1984).
185. Swenson Trucking, 604 P.2d at 1117; see also Kodiak Elec., 694 P.2d at 154.
186. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 286 (Alaska 1976).
187. Id. at 291 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Terrance A. Turner, Comment, The
Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability: An Injury in
Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145,175 (1972)) (omission in original).
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enacted by the legislature in adopting the Uniform Commercial
Code." However, where the claim is one for property damage
rather than mere economic loss, strict products liability will
apply.189
Problems arise, however, because the dividing line between
economic loss and property damage is not always easy to discern.
This is particularly true where the plaintiff seeks compensation for
loss of the product itself. The court emphasized in Cloud v. Kit
Manufacturing Co."9 that it would not establish an all-inclusive
rule to distinguish between the two categories,191 but opined that
claims for direct property damage will ordinarily be characterized by
"sudden and calamitous damage."'" By contrast, economic loss
will be characterized by "deterioration, internal breakage and
depreciation. '""
Subsequent cases have attempted to refine this distinction, but
with little success. In Northern Power & Engineering Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co.," the court stated that:
[W]hen a defective product creates a situation potentially
dangerous to persons or other property, and loss occurs as a
result of that danger, strict liability in tort is an appropriate
theory of recovery, even though the damage is confined to the
product itself. In order to recover on such a theory plaintiff
must show (1) that the loss was a proximate result of the
dangerous defect and (2) that the loss occurred under the kind
of circumstances that made the product a basis for strictliability.195
In other words, where the harm to the product or other
property occurs as a result of some circumstance in which there is
a significant potential for personal injury, the court will likely
conclude that strict products liability should apply.196 For exam-
188. Id. at 286.
189. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 250 (Alaska 1977) (reasoning that
there is no policy reason for distinguishing between personal injuries and property
damage in products liability litigation).
190. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
191. Id. at 251.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 623 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1981).
195. Id. at 329 (Alaska 1981) (footnotes omitted).
196. See Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150,153 (Alaska
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pie, in Kodiak Electric Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc.,"9 the court
held that strict liability should be applied where an electrical fire
caused damage to an electrical generating unit because "there was
evidence of arcing, which presented a serious danger to per-
sons."' 98 However, in Northern Power, strict liability was deter-
mined to be inapplicable not only because there was no evidence
presented of any other danger, but also because the damage was
limited to the electrical generator engine itself."'
VII. INDEmNrTy ISSUES
Under Alaska law, both the manufacturer and the retailer of a
defective product may be held strictly liable when the product
causes injury. In general, a retailer who is held liable on the
theory of strict products liability may obtain indemnity from the
manufacturer, provided that the retailer was not negligent and did
not contribute to the defect."' The manufacturer is responsible
for indemnification "not because of its culpability, but because of its
position at the head of the product distribution chain."'
The manufacturer's obligation to indemnify may extend to both
attorney's fees and any judgment.' If the retailer is without fault,
in that it simply sold a product that was defective before reaching
the retailer's hands, the manufacturer will owe the retailer both the
cost of defense and a general indemnity. °
1984).
197. 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984).
198. Id.
199. 623 P.2d at 329-30. The United States Supreme Court criticized Morrow,
Cloud, and Northern Power, in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc.,
stating that where the damage is limited to the product itself, the purchaser has
merely failed to receive the benefits of the bargain, the traditional concern of
contract law alone. 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986).
200. Koehring Mfg. Co. v. Earthmovers of Fairbanks, 763 P.2d 499, 503-04
(Alaska 1988).
201. Id.; see also Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Kandik Constr., 823 P.2d 632,638
(Alaska 1991) (indemnitor jointly liable in tort with indemnitee may recover
implied indemnity only if the indennitee is not in any degree jointly at fault).
202. Koehring, 763 P.2d at 503.
203. Id.
204. D.G. Shelter Prods. v. Moduline Indus., 684 P.2d 839, 841 n.5 (Alaska
1984).
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Before the manufacturer is required to indemnify, it must have
introduced a defective product into the stream of commerce. This
requires a factual finding of liability on the part of the manufac-
turer. 5 Settlement of the underlying products liability case does
not preclude indemnification.'
The Alaska Supreme Court addressed this requirement in D.G.
Shelter Products v. Moduline Industries.' Two persons were
injured when their mobile home caught fire, releasing toxic
formaldehyde fumes from the interior panelling. The plaintiffs sued
Moduline, the retailer, alleging strict products liability for marketing
a defective item. Prior to trial, Moduline brought a third-party
claim against D.G. Shelter, the manufacturer of one of the compo-
nent parts of the mobile home. Moduline, Shelter and other third-
party defendants eventually settled with the plaintiffs.2" In
discussing Moduline's indemnity claim against D.G. Shelter, the
Alaska Supreme Court stated:
Whether [D.G.] Shelter supplied a defective product must be
resolved before liability for attorney's fees can be determined.
If the trial court determines that [D.G.] Shelter did supply
a defective product, the trial court must then decide Moduline's
liability .... [I]f Moduline is simply an innocent party in the
chain of commerce, having only passed on an already defective
product, then Moduline would be entitled to indemnity and its
attorney's fees, provided [D.G.] Shelter was given proper notice
of the pending litigation and an adequate opportunity to
undertake the defense of the case.w
The Alaska Supreme Court has implicitly reaffirmed its D. G. Shelter
holding in several subsequent pronouncements. 210
205. ML at 841.
206. Id.
207. 684 P.2d 839, 841 (Alaska 1984).
208. Id. at 840.
209. Id. at 841 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
210. Ross Labs. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Alaska 1986) ("a retailer who is
liable on a theory of strict liability may obtain indemnity from a manufacturer,
provided that the retailer was not negligent."); Koehring Mfg. Co. v. Earthmovers
of Fairbanks, 763 P.2d 499, 504 (Alaska 1988) ("a retailer or lessor found liable on
a strict product liability theory may obtain indemnity from the manufacturer,
provided the retailer or lessor was not independently negligent."); Fairbanks N. Star
Borough v. Kandik Constr., 795 P.2d 793, 803 (Alaska 1990) ("[a]n innocent party
who merely passes on an already defective product in the stream of commerce is
entitled to implied noncontractual indemnity from the product producer .... ").
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The court's D.G. Shelter decision conflicts to a certain degree
with its earlier holding in Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales,
Inc.,2" which led many observers to assume that whether or not
a product was defective, the retailer had an automatic right to
indemnity from the manufacturer.212 In Heritage, the manufactur-
er was required to indemnify the retailer for its attorney's fees
incurred in its successful defense of a products liability suit.2 3 In
reaching this decision, the court provided the following dictum:
If the right to costs and attorney's fees for defending the lawsuit
is made contingent on losing on the merits of that action, in
every case the indemnitee would be put in the difficult position
of attempting to show lack of his own culpability at the same
time that he is aiding the plaintiff's case by attempting to prove
the liability of his indemnitor. Such a situation certainly would
be contrary to both the indemnitee's and indemnitor's interests
in many instances, and we decline to create an incentive for
accomplishing that result.214
However, a reading of Heritage that indicates a manufacturer
must indemnify the retailer regardless of whether the product is
defective overlooks the critical limiting aspect of the court's holding:
[WIhere indemnification is required, and the indemnitor has been
given proper notice of the pending litigation and an adequate
opportunity to undertake its duty to defend, the indemnitee is
entitled to recover full costs and attorney's fees for the expenses
of its successful defense of the action giving rise to the claim for
indemnity.215
Heritage states the rule that applies when the right to indemnity has
already been determined. In Heritage a directed verdict against the
manufacturer was not appealed.216 Thus, under Heritage, if the
manufacturer has an obligation to indemnify the retailer in the first
instance, then the retailer is entitled to be indemnified for its costs
and attorney's fees incurred in defending the suit.2 17 The Alaska
211. 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979); see also Hanover, Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
758 P.2d 443, 448 n.1 (Utah App. 1988) (recognizing conflict between D.G. Shelter
and Heritage).
212. See Hanover, LtL, 758 P.2d at 448 n.1.
213. Heritage, 604 P.2d at 1067.
214. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 1067 n.25.
217. Id.
1993]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court has recognized this limited holding of Heritage in
subsequent opinions.
21
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Alaska, the manufacturer orretailer of a product will be held
strictly liable in tort when it places a product on the market
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, and the
product proves to have a defect that causes injury. The defect may
be either one of manufacture, design, or the failure to provide
adequate warnings. In determining the existence of a defect, the
injured party must prove either 1) that the product failed to satisfy
the ordinary consumer's expectations or 2) that its design proximate-
ly caused injury, and the manufacturer failed to show that the
benefits outweighed the risks of harm inherent in the design.
Several affirmative defenses are also available including comparative
negligence, scientific unknowability, superseding cause, and
subsequent modifications.
218. Vertces Corp. v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 661 P.2d 619,622-23 (Alaska 1983)
(citing Heritage and stating that given manufacturer duty to indemnify retailer,
manufacturer also has duty to defend retailer, who may recover costs and attorney's
fees); D.G. Shelter Prods. v. Moduline Indus., 684 P.2d 839, 841 (Alaska 1984)
(where indemnity is required of manufacturer, retailer's right to recover costs and
attorney's fees seems axiomatic); Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Roen Design, 727
P.2d 758, 761 (Alaska 1986) (as policy matter, the right to attorney's fees is
determined by the right to indemnity).
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